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ABSTRACT: The most remarkable feature of the Soviet Union’s demography
is its ethnic diversity. More than 90 ethnic groups are indigenous to the territory
of the Soviet Union. Ethnic Russians composed only 50.8 percent of the
population according to preliminary 1989 census results. The article examines
official Soviet statistics for the period 1959 to 1989 to illustrate some of the risks
in describing Soviet demographic behavior. Is fertility in the Soviet Union high
or low? Answer: both. Is the Soviet population growing rapidly or slowly?
Answer: both. The changing ethnic composition of the population of the USSR
as a whole reflects large differences in growth rates of ethnic groups; the
changing composition of the USSR by region also reflects differences in
migration by ethnic group. Differences in growth rates are reshaping the ethnic
composition of the Soviet labor force. For the USSR as a whole between 1979
and 1989, three-fourths of the net increment to the working ages was contributed
by the one-sixth of the population in 1979 that was traditionally Muslim in
religion.
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THE Soviet Union has the third-largest-L population of any country in the
world. The 1989 census counted 286.7 mil-
lion people.’ Developments in the Soviet
population have been of great interest be-
cause of its size and because of the impor-
tance of the Soviet Union in world affairs.
In addition, reports of unfavorable demo-
graphic features of the Soviet population,
such as high rates of infant mortality and
adult mortality, have been cited within the
country and abroad as evidence of the low
quality of life in the Soviet Union com-
pared to other industrial countries. The in-
fant mortality rate, for example, was 25.4
infant deaths per 1000 live births in 1987;
life expectancy at birth for Soviet males
was 65.0 years and for females, 73.8 years,
in 1986-87.’
Perhaps the most remarkable feature of
the Soviet Union’s demography is not its
size or the state of its public health but its
ethnic diversity. Members of more than
ninety ethnic groups that are indigenous to
the territory of the Soviet Union were
counted in the 1989 census. Twenty-two
ethnic groups-&dquo;nationalities,&dquo; in com-
mon Soviet usage-had populations of 1
million or more. Ethnic Russians com-
posed 50.8 percent of the population in
1989 and they will fall below 50 percent of
the Soviet population before the middle of
the 1990s.~ In addition to 145 million eth-
nic Russians in 1989, the Soviet population
had 56 million members of other Slavic
nationalities, 56 million members of na-
tionalities whose traditional religion is
Islam, and another 29 million people who
are neither Slavs nor Muslims. Moreover,
the Muslim population is growing rapidly.
Though comprising only one-sixth of the
population of the USSR in 1979, Muslims
contributed 50 percent of the increase in
the Soviet population between 1979 and
1989.
It should be difficult for observers of the
Soviet Union today to ignore the multi-
ethnic character of that country, as the
non-Russian nationalities seek greater
economic, cultural, and political auton-
omy, sometimes manifesting their feel-
ings in large-scale public demonstrations.
There have been many reported inci-
dents of violence between ethnic groups-
not only, as might be commonly supposed,
1. This is the total of the de facto or present (in
Russian, nalichnoe) population in the USSR accord-
ing to preliminary figures from the 1989 census. The
de jure or permanent (postoiannoe) population is 1
million less: 285.7 million. The State Committee on
Statistics of the USSR-formerly the Central Statis-
tical Board - has changed the way in which it reports
most population data in the censuses. Barbara A.
Anderson and Brian D. Silver, "’Permanent’ and
’Present’ Populations in Soviet Statistics," Soviet
Studies, 37:386-402 (July 1985). Accordingly, unless
noted otherwise, all data in this article from the 1959
and 1970 Soviet censuses refer to the present popula-
tion, and all data from the 1979 and 1989 censuses
refer to the permanent population.
2. All of these reported figures are subject to
error. Infant deaths appear to be underreported sub-
stantially, especially in the regions with high rates;
and Soviet definitions of "infant death" and "live
birth" differ from those proposed by the World Health
Organization. We estimate that the reported infant
mortality rates for the Soviet Union need to be inflated
by at least 22 percent to make them comparable with
World Health Organization definitions. Barbara A.
Anderson and Brian D. Silver, "Infant Mortality in the
Soviet Union: Regional Differences and Measure-
ment Issues," Population and Development Review,
12:705-38(Dec. 1986). Life expectancy at birth is
probably overestimated, due to underreporting of
deaths, overstatement of age at death, and overstate-
ment of age in Soviet censuses. Idem, "The Changing
Shape of Soviet Mortality, 1958-85: An Evaluation of
Old and New Evidence," Population Studies, 43:243-
65 (July 1989).
3. For further discussion of the changing ethnic
composition of the Soviet population, see Barbara A.
Anderson and Brian D. Silver, "Demographic Sources
of the Changing Ethnic Composition of the Soviet
Union," Population and Development Review, Dec.
1989, vol. 15.
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between Russians and non-Russians, but
also between members of non-Russian
nationalities.
But even today one often reads of Soviet
public health, Soviet mortality, and Soviet
population growth, as if the range of demo-
graphic experience in the USSR were
small. In this article we highlight the mag-
nitude of the demographic differences as-
sociated with the ethnic diversity of the
USSR, while describing trends in some of
the main indicators of demographic
change.
Our analysis is based on official Soviet
population statistics.’ Although ethnic dif-
ferences in demographic behavior are very
important in the Soviet Union, we cannot
conduct our entire analysis on this basis,
because very few data by ethnic group have
been published. Thus part of our analysis
relies on examination of regional patterns.
The Soviet Union has a federal political
system. Most major types of demographic
data are published both for the Soviet
Union as a whole and for the 15 major
constituent union republics-also known
as Soviet Socialist Republics (SSRs)-but
not for ethnic groups. The 15 SSRs are
listed in Table 1.
The SSRs are the traditional homelands
of major ethnic groups. These ethnic
groups are the titular nationalities of these
regions in the sense that the areas are
named after the ethnic group - Kazakhstan
after the Kazakhs, Ukraine after the Ukrai-
nians, and so on. But none of the areas is
ethnically homogeneous. As shown in
Table 1, the percentage of a republic’s pop-
ulation that is of the titular nationality
ranges from a low of 39.5 percent in
Kazakhstan to a high of 93.9 percent in
Armenia. Consequently, statistics for the
SSRs do not reflect only the demographic
behavior of the titular nationality. Never-
theless, differences in the behavior of the
titular nationalities are the main source of
differences in most demographic behaviors
of the populations of the SSRs. We shall
use demographic statistics on ethnic
groups when they are available.
SOVIET DEMOGRAPHIC BEHAVIOR
AS A COMPOSITE OF
THE BEHAVIOR OF ITS PARTS
Change in the behavior of a population
often reflects different rates of change in
different subpopulations. For example,
from 1971 to 1976, the infant mortality rate
(IMR) in the Soviet Union rose from 22.9
infant deaths per 1000 live births to 31.4,
an increase of 37 percent. This increase
was much larger in the rural areas: the IMR
in rural areas rose from 24.3 to 37.8-an
increase of 56 percent-while the IMR in
the urban areas increased 24 percent, from
21.6 to 26.7. By 1987, the IMR of the
country as a whole had fallen to 25.4; in the
urban areas it was 21.1, and in the rural
areas it was 31.5. Thus the only reason the
IMR in the USSR as a whole was higher in
1987 than in 1971 is that the rural IMR was
higher in 1987 than it had been in 1971.
Social scientists sometimes use the term
&dquo;compositional effect&dquo; to describe situa-
tions in which changes in the behavior of
the whole population are a result of
changes in the composition of that popula-
tion rather than changes in the behavior of
the constituent parts. For example, if a
population consists of two subpopulations,
one with a crude birth rate (CBR) of 20 live
births per 1000 population and another
with a CBR of 40, then the CBR of the
4. These data have appeared in a variety of
sources and are based either on Soviet censuses-of
1959, 1970, 1979, and 1989-or on vital registration
statistics. The data on ethnic groups for 1989 come
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PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF THE SOVIET POPULATION AMONG REGIONS, 1987
combined population would depend on the
distribution of the population between the
two groups. The CBR for the entire popu-
lation would fall somewhere between 20
and 40. If the shares of the population that
belonged to each group changed over time,
while the CBRs of each subpopulation re-
mained the same, then the change in the
CBR of the entire population would be a
compositional effect.
Of course, in real populations, change
in the whole population usually involves
both compositional changes and changes
in the behavior of the separate sub-
populations. In a population as diverse as
that of the Soviet Union, the contribution
of compositional changes to the changes in




Let us examine some data on the Soviet
population in 1987.~ Figure 1 shows the
shares of the Soviet population that belong
to each of five regional groupings of 15
SSRs: Russia, or the Russian Soviet Feder-
ated Socialist Republic (RSFSR); Baltic,
composed of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithua-
nia ; the West, comprising Belorussia, Mol-
davia, and the Ukraine; Armenia-Georgia,
comprising Armenia and Georgia; and the
Muslim SSRs, which are Azerbaijan, Kaz-
akhstan, Kirghizia, Tadzhikistan, Turkmen-
5. We use this year because it is the latest year
for which we have data on all of the indicators for
which the following comparison is to be made.
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istan, and Uzbekistan.’ A slight majority of
the population, 51.6 percent, lived in the
RSFSR. Only about 3 percent of the popu-
lation lived in the Baltic or in Armenia-
Georgia. Another 23 percent lived in the
three republics of the Soviet West, and 19
percent lived in the six Muslim republics.
Since these groupings exhaust the popula-
tion of the USSR, the weighted average of
the demographic behavior of the parts rep-
resents the demographic behavior of the
USSR as a whole.
Now let us examine the share of births
and deaths that occurred in each region in
1987. We pay particular attention to the
shares contributed by the RSFSR and the
six Muslim republics. Figure 2a shows that
45 percent of all births occurred in the
RSFSR and 32 percent in the Muslim re-
publics. Figure 2b shows that 55 percent of
all deaths occurred in the RSFSR, and only
14 percent in the Muslim republics. Fig-
ure 2c shows that while 34 percent of all
infant deaths occurred in the RSFSR, 51
percent occurred in the Muslim republics.
Finally, Figure 2d shows that while 35 per-
cent of the natural increase -births minus
deaths - occurred in the RSFSR, 50 per-
cent occurred in the Muslim republics.
The shares contributed by each of the
population subgroups vary greatly from
one demographic indicator to the next be-
cause of differences between the sub-
groups in fertility, mortality, and age struc-
ture. The shares of demographic events for
the Muslim republics differ from their
share for the Soviet population because the
Muslim republics have high fertility, high
infant mortality, and a young population
compared to the rest of the Soviet Union.
This illustrates some of the risks in de-
scribing Soviet demographic behavior. Is
fertility in the Soviet Union high or low?
Answer: Both. It is low in the non-Muslim
republics and very high in the Muslim re-
publics. Is the Soviet population growing
rapidly or slowly? Answer: Both. It is
growing rapidly in the Muslim republics,
at 2.0 percent per year, and slowly in the
non-Muslim republics at less than 1 per-
cent per year.
Therefore, when one speaks of Soviet
demographic behavior, one is speaking of
an average of behaviors that differ greatly
across regions and ethnic groups. This av-
erage reflects the behavior of some of the
parts better than others, depending on the
demographic indicator referred to. More-
over, the average does not necessarily
mainly reflect the behavior of the largest
ethnic segments of the population, such




Data for Soviet regions are an imperfect
surrogate for data on ethnic groups. Fortu-
nately, for some demographic indicators
we have direct data on ethnic groups. All
Soviet citizens have a nationality (in Rus-
sian, natsional’nost’).’ After they receive
their internal passport at age 16, Soviet
citizens have an official nationality, which
is listed on their identity papers, employ-
ment records, military records, and so
forth. It is difficult or impossible for an
individual to change this official national-
6. This is a conventional grouping of the So-
viet republics, except for our placing of Azerbaijan
with the other Muslim republics rather than with the
two other Transcaucasian republics of Armenia and
Georgia.
7. For a discussion of the terminology used in
Soviet statistics on ethnic groups, see Brian D. Silver,
"The Ethnic and Language Dimensions in Russian
and Soviet Censuses," in Research Guide to the Rus-
sian and Soviet Censuses, ed. Ralph S. Clem (Ithaca,




PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF THE SOVIET
POPULATION AMONG NATIONALITY GROUPINGS, 1989
ity. Nationality in the Soviet censuses,
however, is a subjective phenomenon,
based on the self-report of the individual.
Even if there were no emigration from
the Soviet Union, ethnic groups would not
be closed populations, since people can
migrate into or out of a given nationality
by changing their self-reported ethnic
identity from one census to the next. We
refer to this process as ethnic reidentifica-
tion. There is evidence of substantial ethnic
reidentification among Soviet non-Russian
nationalities in the past.8
Change in the number of people belong-
ing to the different Soviet nationalities is
therefore not simply a result of fertility,
mortality, and international migration.
Based on projections of the population in
1989 from earlier data, whether ethnic
Russians remained a majority of the popu-
lation of the USSR in 1989 depended sub-
stantially on the extent of ethnic reidentifi-
cation of the population between the
censuses of 1979 and 1989. Some people
who identified as a member of a non-
Russian nationality in 1979 could have
called themselves Russian in 1989, and
some who identified as Russian in 1979
could have identified with a non-Russian
nationality in 1989.’
Figure 3 shows the share of the popula-
tion that belonged to four groupings of
Soviet nationalities, according to prelimi-
nary data from the 1989 Soviet census:
Russians constituted 50.8 percent; non-
Russian Slavs, 19.5 percent; other non-
8. For a summary of the evidence, as well as a
discussion of methods of measuring ethnic reidentifi-
cation, see Barbara A. Anderson, "Some Factors Re-
lated to Ethnic Reidentification in the Russian Repub-
lic," in Soviet Nationality Policies and Practices
(New York: Praeger, 1978), pp. 309-33; Barbara A.
Anderson and Brian D. Silver, "Estimating Russifica-
tion of Ethnic Identity among Non-Russians in the
USSR," Demography, 20:461-89 (Nov. 1983).
9. For further discussion, see Anderson and Sil-
ver, "Demographic Sources."
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Muslims, 10.3 percent; and Muslims, 19.4
percent. The number of people that this
represents is given in panel A of Table 2.
These figures are based on the entire Soviet
population, not only the titular nationalities
of the 15 union republics.&dquo;
In 1989, Russians remained a bare ma-
jority of the Soviet population. We think
the number of Russians is somewhat
smaller than might have been expected,
due to a decrease in the tendency of non-
Russians to change their identification to
Russian and perhaps to a return by some
self-declared Russians to an earlier non-
Russian ethnic identity. But with the avail-
able data, we cannot measure the extent of
ethnic reidentification between 1979 and
1989.’1
Panel B of Table 2 shows that Russians
compose a decreasing share of the Soviet
population between the last four census
dates, from 54.7 percent in 1959 to 50.8
percent in 1989. Muslims, on the other
hand, constitute an increasing share, from
11.8 percent in 1959 to 19.4 percent in
1989. Non-Russian Slavs decreased their
share from 22.5 percent to 19.5 percent,
while other non-Muslims decreased from
11.0 percent to 10.3 percent. All four
groupings, however, grew in absolute size
in each intercensal period.
Panel D of Table 2 shows how much
each of the four groupings of nationalities
contributed to the overall population
growth of the Soviet Union between the
last four census dates. Most noticeable are
the relative contributions of Muslims and
Russians. Between 1959 and 1970 Mus-
lims contributed 31.7 percent of the popu-
lation growth of the USSR and Russians
contributed 45.4 percent, but by 1979-89
this contribution had reversed: Muslims
contributed 49.7 percent and Russians,
32.6 percent. This reversal reflects the con-
tinuing high fertility rates of Muslim na-
tionalities and the low fertility rates of Rus-
sians, other Slavs, and other non-Muslims.
The differences in the growth rates of
nationalities underlie the differences in the
natural increase of Soviet regional popula-
tions depicted in Figure 2d.’2 But a com-
parison of growth rates by region and by
nationality -compare panel C of Table 2
with panel C of Table 3 - also makes clear
that use of regional data in place of ethnic
group data often reduces the magnitude of
the differences in demographic behavior.13
In the period 1979-89, for example, the
Muslim population grew at an average an-
nual rate of 2.4 percent, while the popula-
tion of the six Muslim republics grew at an
annual rate of 2.0 percent. Similarly, the
number of Russians grew at an average
annual rate of 0.5 percent, while the popu-
lation of the RSFSR grew at a rate of 0.7
percent. The regional difference is smaller
10. The Muslim population of the USSR, for
example, consists of-in addition to the titular nation-
alities of the six Muslim SSRs - the VolgaTatars, with
6.6 million people in 1989; the Peoples of Dagestan,
with 2.1 million; the Chechens, with 1.0 million; and
21 more Muslim nationalities.
11. Estimation of the amount of ethnic reidentifi-
cation requires data on the age distribution of the
population by nationality. To date&mdash;Dec. 1989-no
data on age by nationality have been published for
either the 1979 or 1989 Soviet censuses.
12. In Figure 2d, we are able to depict rates of
natural increase&mdash;births minus deaths&mdash;by region,
because birth and death rates are reported for SSRs.
In Table 2, we are not able to depict rates of natural
increase of ethnic groups because birth and death rates
are not reported for nationalities. But the growth rates
given in the table’s panel C closely approximate the
rates of natural increase, since only a few nationalities
have experienced substantial international migration
in recent decades.
13. For further illustrations of this general point,
see Brian D. Silver, "Levels of Sociocultural Devel-
opment among Soviet Nationalities: A Partial Test of
the Equalization Hypothesis," American Political
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ESTIMATED RATES OF NET INTERCENSAL
IN-MIGRATION OF RUSSIANS TO REGIONS, 1959-89
NOTE: This figure shows the estimated amount of Russian net in-migration to the region between
censuses divided by the number of Russians in the region at the first census.
than the ethnic group difference because
regions are not ethnically homogeneous
and because of different migration patterns
by ethnic group. In particular, between
1979 and 1989, on balance, Russians mi-
grated out of the Muslim republics and the
net migration of Russians out of the
RSFSR was close to zero.
Figure 4 shows the estimated net num-
ber of Russian migrants into each region
between recent census dates divided by the
number of persons in the region at the
initial date. Thus it shows the proportion
by which the population of the region
would have increased or decreased in the
period due to the migration of Russians.14
We can refer to this as a net migration rates
Between 1959 and 1970, as well as be-
tween 1970 and 1979, there was net migra-
tion of Russians into the Muslim republics.
Most of this migration was to the Virgin
Lands territory of Kazakhstan,’6 but there
14. Russians experienced very little international
migration. Thus their growth in the Soviet Union as a
whole is primarily the result of natural increase. The
net number of Russian migrants into a region was
estimated as the difference between the number of
Russians in the region at the second date and the
number of Russians there would have been in the
region if the Russian population had grown between
censuses proportionately to the Russian population in
the entire Soviet Union. For more discussion of these
estimates, see Anderson and Silver, "Demographic
Sources."
15. Strictly speaking, there can be no net migra-
tion rate because there is no population at risk of net
migration; however, such a measure is conventionally 
referred to as a net migration rate.
16. In 1959-70, an estimated 69 percent of the net
Russian migration to the Muslim republics was to
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was a net influx of Russians into five of the
six Muslim republics in both the 1959-70
and 1970-79 intercensal periods-the ex-
ception was Azerbaijan, from which there
was net out-migration of Russians in both
periods. Between 1979 and 1989, however,
there was net out-migration of Russians
from all six Muslim republics.&dquo;
Figure 4 also shows that there was net
out-migration of Russians from Armenia
and Georgia in all three intercensal periods
as well as net in-migration of Russians to
both the Baltic and the Soviet West in all
three periods. Russians were not the only
internal migrants; however, Russians,
Ukrainians, and Belorussians composed
the bulk of those Soviet citizens who
moved across union-republic boundaries
in response to new jobs.
In the 1950s and 1960s, a policy of the
intermixing of different nationalities was
endorsed openly by central authorities, and
relocation of labor was one method of
achieving such mixing. This policy has
long been controversial in the non-Russian
republics. The net result of the migration
patterns by different ethnic groups in re-
cent decades has been the increasing ethnic
homogenization and, one might say, in-
digenization, of the Muslim republics, Ar-
menia, and Georgia, and the decreasing
homogenization - increasing Russianiza-
tion-of the Baltic and the Soviet West. In
September 1989, the Central Committee of
the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
for the first time formally acknowledged
the adverse consequences of this policy-
in particular, its threat to the preservation
of ethnic distinctiveness and its exacerba-
tion of interethnic tensions.’8
DIFFERENCES IN REGIONAL AND
ETHNIC DEMOGRAPHIC PATTERNS
In the remainder of this article, we ex-
plore several dimensions of Soviet demo-
graphic behavior by region and by ethnic
group. We turn now to infant mortality.
Infant mortality
The IMR is often interpreted as an indi-
cator of the quality of life in a society. It
reflects the effects of personal health and
hygiene, diet, public health and sanitation
programs, and the quality and availability
of medical services. Figure 5 shows the
differences in the average IMRs for the
republics in each group at five-year inter-
vals from 1960 to 1985. The IMR for the
USSR as a whole in 1985 was about the
same as it was in 1965. This contrasts with
the trend toward improvement in infant
mortality in most other countries of the
industrial world.
The data for separate regional group-
ings show different levels and trends in
infant mortality. In the RSFSR and the
Baltic, the IMR declined in each five-year
interval except 1970-75. In the West also
the IMR rose between 1970 and 1975 and
was lower in 1985 than in 1960 and 1965,
but between 1965 and 1985 there was little
decline. The pattern in Armenia and Geor-
gia is similar to that found in the West,
except that the IMR in 1985 was much
lower than the IMR in 1965. In general, the
patterns of change in the IMRs in the
Kazakhstan; in 1970-79, an estimated 44 percent of
the net Russian migration to these republics was to
Kazakhstan.
17. For further details on the ethnic patterns of
migration, see Brian D. Silver, "Population Redistri-
bution and the Ethnic Balance in Transcaucasia," in
Nationalism and Sacial Change in Transcaucasia, ed.
Ronald G. Suny (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan
Press, 1983), pp. 376-96; Anderson and Silver, "De-
mographic Sources."
18. See "Party’s Draft Platform on Nationalities




INFANT MORTALITY RATE FOR USSR AND SOVIET REGIONS, 1960-85
RSFSR, Baltic, West, and Armenia-
Georgia were similar to one another be-
tween 1960 and 1985.
The most distinctive pattern appears in
the Muslim republics. There the reported
IMR in 1960 was, on average, lower than
that found in the USSR as a whole and in
the other four regions. It then rose to a peak
in the mid-1970s and subsequently de-
clined. The average IMR in 1985, however,
was substantially higher than the IMR in
1960, 1965, and 1970, and it was much
higher than the IMR in the other Soviet
regions.
Why the distinctive pattern among
Muslim republics? The figures for 1960
tell part of the story. Medical services,
health care, and public sanitation are of
lower quality and more limited availability
in the Muslim republics, especially those
in Central Asia, than in most other regions
of the USSR.19 That the IMR in 1960 re-
ported for the Muslim republics was lower
than the IMRs reported for other regions
undoubtedly reflects underreporting of in-
fant deaths in the Muslim republics. This
does not mean that all infant deaths were
reported in other regions, but the extent of
the underreporting was probably much
greater in the Muslim areas.2° The rise in
19. We have heard reports of IMRs of over 100
for some remote parts of Siberia, within the RSFSR.
No IMRs that high have been officially published for
any region of the Soviet Union in recent years, how-
ever.
20. Elsewhere we estimated the IMRs for the
indigenous nationalities of the Muslim republics. We
found that in 1959, the IMRs of people belonging to
the indigenous nationalities were lower than the IMRs
of the European-background population&mdash;such as
Russians and Ukrainians&mdash;living in the Muslim re-
publics. This is implausible. See Barbara A. Ander-
son, Brian D. Silver, and Jinyun Liu, "Mortality of
Ethnic Groups in Soviet Central Asia and Northern
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the IMRs in the Muslim republics in later
years probably reflects mostly improve-
ments in the reporting of infant deaths, not
worsening actual infant mortality. In other
words, the actual IMRs in the Muslim re-
publics in 1960 were probably higher than
the rates reported in the mid-1970s and
later.
Elsewhere we have argued that the rise
in reported infant mortality in the Soviet
Union in the early 1970s was mostly an
artifact of improvements in statistical re-
cord keeping and the completeness of re-
porting of infant deaths, especially in So-
viet Central Asia. Both in Central Asia and
elsewhere in the Soviet Union, new proce-
dures introduced in the early 1970s for
tabulating infant deaths, along with in-
creasing incentives for registering infants
who were at high risk of dying in infancy,
could have raised the reported IMRs even
if the actual IMRs remained the same or
declined.2’ We think these new procedures
and incentives would have had this effect
not only in the Muslim republics but also
in other parts of the Soviet Union.
This does not mean that all increases in
mortality reported in the 1960s and 1970s
in the Soviet Union were an artifact of
improved reporting. The increase in re-
ported mortality of working-age males be-
ginning in the mid-1960s probably re-
flected real worsening of the health of
Soviet males.22 Moreover, it is possible that
some of the increase in infant mortality was
also real. There are many reports, for ex-
ample, of poor water quality in Central
Asia, perhaps intensified by the increasing
population density in rural areas.
Fertility rates
Part of the explanation of the high rates
of infant mortality among Soviet Muslim
populations may be high fertility. When
women have many children, especially in
the context of limited availability of pre-
natal care or limited possibility of using the
available services, then newborns are likely
to be at high risk of dying. Among some
Muslim populations, such as Tadzhiks and
Turkmenians, the frequency of marriages
between cousins is also a special risk factor
for infant mortality.
Figure 6 shows the average total fertility
rate (TFR) for the titular nationalities of the
five regions of the USSR at three dates,
1958-59, 1969-70, and 1978-79, as re-
ported by Soviet demographers.23 The TFR
is the number of children that a woman
would have in her reproductive life if she
followed a given age-specific fertility
schedule, such as that of all women in a
given year. Figure 6 shows that the TFR of
the Muslim groups is much higher than that
of the others. On average, as late as 1978-
79, Muslim women could expect to bear
5.6 children, while non-Muslim women
could expect to bear between 1.8 and 2.3
children.
The comparatively low fertility of non-
Muslim women is not a result of a high
incidence of childlessness; in fact, very
high proportions of non-Muslim women
marry and have at least one child. High
China," Research Reports (University of Michigan,
Population Studies Center), Sept. 1989, no. 89-158.
21. See Anderson and Silver, "Infant Mortality in
the Soviet Union."
22. For further discussion, see Barbara A. Ander-
son and Brian D. Silver, "Sex Differentials in Mortal-
ity in the Soviet Union: Regional Differences in
Length of Working Life in Comparative Perspective,"
Population Studies, 40:191-214 (July 1986); idem,
"Changing Shape"; idem, "Patterns of Cohort Mortal-
ity in the Soviet Population," Population and Devel-
opment Review, 15:471-501 (Sept. 1989).
23. G. Bondarskaia and L. Darskii, "Etnicheskaia
differentsiatsiia rozhdaemosti v SSSR" (Ethnic dif-
ferentiation of fertility in the USSR), Vestnik statistiki,
Dec. 1988, no. 12, pp. 16-21.
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FIGURE 6
AVERAGE TOTAL FERTILITY RATE OF
TITULAR NATIONALITY IN UNION REPUBLICS WITHIN REGIONS, 1958-79
fertility of Soviet Muslim women has per-
sisted despite their high levels of education
compared to Muslim women in other coun-
tries. For example, in the rural population
of Tadzhikistan in 1979, 48 percent of fe-
males aged 10 or over had at least seven
years of education; and of the six Muslim
republics, the population of Tadzhikistan
had the lowest level of educational attain-
ment in 1979. In contrast, in Egypt in 1976,
only 15 percent of females aged 10 or over
had at least primary education.
The rise in the reported TFR among
Muslims between 1958-59 and 1969-70
was probably the result of a combination
of some real increase in fertility and an
artifactual increase in fertility resulting
from more complete reporting of births.24
It has been estimated, for example, that in
Tadzhikistan 23 percent of the births in the
latter 1950s were not reported .15 Un-
24. A real increase in fertility between 1959 and
1970 could have occurred as a result of a reduction in
the proportion of women of childbearing ages who are
married to much older men. See Barbara A. Anderson,
"Male Age and Fertility: Results from Ireland prior to
1911," Population Index, 41:561-66 (1974).
25. See Ansley J. Coale, Barbara A. Anderson,
and Erna H&auml;rm, Human Fertility in Russia since the
Nineteenth Century (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univer-
sity Press, 1979); Anderson and Silver, "Estimating
Russification." For indirect evidence of improvement
in registration of births, see idem, "The Effects of the
Registration System on the Seasonality of Births: The
Case of the Soviet Union," Population Studies,
42:303-20 (July 1988).
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derregistration persisted into the 1960s
and 1970s but probably diminished in
prevalence. 16
The strong ethnic differences in the
TFRs illustrate why the answer to the ques-
tion, Is fertility in the Soviet Union high or
low? is, Both. At the same time, it is clear
that the rates are changing. As shown in
Figure 6, they declined for all ethnic group-
ings between 1969-70 and 1978-79. In
later years, for which we have data by
region but not by ethnic group, the TFRs of
Muslim areas continued to decline through
the 1980s, but they rose slightly in the
non-Muslim areas. As a result, the TFR of
the USSR population in 1986-87 was 2.51,
compared to 2.27 in 1978-79.
High-order births
Another indicator of differences in fer-
tility behavior within the Soviet Union is
the prevalence of high-order births. Fig-
ure 7 shows the percentage of births that
are of fifth or higher order for various
years for which data are available for So-
viet republics.
If any single measure could testify to the
sharp difference in the life situations of
women, and the comparative risks of infant
mortality between regions and ethnic
groups, it is this one. In the 1960s and early
1970s, more than 30 percent of all births
were of fifth or higher order in the Muslim
republics. Even in 1986, one of every six
births in the Muslim republics was fifth
order or higher.&dquo;
The percentage of high-order births has
dropped at successive dates in every re-
gion, except for the increase between 1965
and 1970 in the Muslim SSRs. This is
consistent with the pattern of change in the
TFRs during the same time span.
Distribution by age
A major consequence of the differences
in fertility between regions and ethnic
groups is differences in the age distribu-
tions of the population as well as differ-
ences in the growth of segments of the age
structure. Of special interest is the size of
the working-age population, as well as the
population below and above the working
ages. By convention in Soviet labor statis-
tics, the working ages are 16-59 for men
and 16-54 for women, although this does
not mean that all people enter the labor
force exactly at age 16 and retire at age 55
or 60.
Panels A through C of Table 4 show for
each regional grouping the number of per-
sons in the three age categories at the time
of the censuses of 1959,1970, and 1979, as
well as in 1987, which is not a census
year.28 The data from these panels are sum-
marized in Figure 8. We use data on regions
26. Coale, Anderson, and H&auml;rm, Human Fertil-
ity in Russia; Barbara A. Anderson and Brian D.
Silver, "Estimating Census Undercount from School-
Enrollment Data: An Application to the Soviet Cen-
suses of 1959 and 1970," Demography, 20:461-89
(Nov. 1983); W. Ward Kingkade, An Evaluation of
Selected Soviet Population Statistics, CIR Staff Paper
no. 9, U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the
Census, Center for International Research, Nov. 1985.
27. This measure actually understates the differ-
ence between Muslim and non-Muslim fertility, be-
cause it does not take into account differences in the
age structures of the regional populations. Since the
age distribution of women in the Muslim republics is
much younger than the age distribution of women in
other regions, proportionately fewer Muslim women
would be near the end of their childbearing years.
28. The latest date for which age data for the
Soviet population have been published is 1987, a
noncensus year. Age distributions in Soviet censuses
are subject to error caused by undercounting of young
children, older adolescents, and young adults, as well
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FIGURE 7
PERCENTAGE OF BIRTHS THAT WERE
ORDER FIVE OR HIGHER FOR USSR AND SOVIET REGIONS, 1965-86
rather than ethnic groups because statistics
on the age distributions of ethnic groups
have not been published since the 1970
census.
Four of the regions - RSFSR, Baltic,
West, and Armenia-Georgia -experienced
little change between 1959 and 1987 in the
number of persons under the working ages.
The dip between 1970 and 1979 in the
RSFSR is an echo of the small size of the
cohort of women born during World War
II, which resulted in a small cohort being
bom during the 1970s. A similar, though
weaker, pattern appears also in the West
and the Baltic.
In the fifth region - the Muslim SSRs -
the number of persons below working ages
more than doubled between 1959 and
1987, from 10.1 million to 21.1 million.
This is not surprising in light of the differ-
entials in fertility observed earlier. More-
over, the Muslim populations of Soviet
Central Asia did not suffer losses in World
War II as severe as those suffered by the
Russians, Balts, Ukrainians, and Belorus-
sians and hence do not show a decline
between 1970 and 1979 in the number of
people below the working ages.&dquo;
All of the regions experienced growth
in the number of persons in the working
as age misstatement, including age exaggeration, by
old people. For further discussion, see Anderson and
Silver, "Estimating Census Undercount"; Lea Keil
Garson, "The Centenarian Question: Old Age Mortal-
ity in the Soviet Union 1897-1970" (Ph.D. diss.,
Princeton University, 1986). We do not have enough
information to correct the age distributions for each
region.
29. For further discussion of the demographic
impact of World War II on Soviet nationalities, see
Barbara A. Anderson and Brian D. Silver, "Demo-
graphic Consequences of World War II on the Non-
Russian Nationalities of the USSR," in The Impact of
World War II on the Soviet Union (Totowa, NJ: Row-
man & Allanheld, 1985), pp. 207-42; idem, "Patterns


























































































































































ages in each interval. The largest absolute
growth occurred in the RSFSR-15.2 mil-
lion. The sharpest rise in the RSFSR oc-
curred between 1970 and 1979. The in-
crease in population in the working ages in
the Muslim republics between 1959 and
1987 -14.4 million - nearly equaled that
of the RSFSR. In relative terms, the growth
of the working-age population in the
Muslim republics-105.8 percent-far
outstripped the growth in the RSFSR-
22.2 percent.
Every region experienced growth in the
number of persons above the working ages.
In both absolute and relative terms, the
largest increase - 12.8 million, or 92.3 per-
cent - occurred in the RSFSR. But the rel-
ative growth was quite substantial in all
regions except the Baltic. Even in the
Muslim republics the number of persons
above working age increased by 77.2 per-
cent between 1959 and 1987. The growth
of this number in the Baltic was probably
held down by the fact that its population
was relatively old even in 1959.
The Muslim republics are the only re-
gion to experience substantial growth in all
three age segments between 1959 and
1987. As a result, they are becoming an
increasingly large contributor to the net
increments to the Soviet population in the
working ages and above the working ages.
As shown in panel E of Table 4, in the
1959-70 and 1970-79 intercensal periods,
the Muslim SSRs contributed about a third
of the net additions to the working-age
population of the USSR. Between 1979
and 1987, however, the Muslim SSRs con-
tributed three-fourths of the net increment
to the working-age population of the
USSR.
This does not mean that three of every
four workers first entering the labor force
comes from a Muslim republic. Only about
one-fourth of new entrants to the working
ages between 1979 and 1987 lived in a
Muslim republic.3° The net increment to
the working ages from a given region is the
difference between the number of people
in that region entering the working ages
and the number leaving the working ages,
whether through reaching pension age or
through death. The relatively young age
composition of the populations of the
Muslim republics means that they account
for a very substantial share of the new
entrants plus survivors in the working ages,
even larger than their contribution of 50
percent of the net increment to the Soviet
population as a whole between 1979 and
1989.
Another source of the increasing contri-
bution of the Muslim republics to the work-
ing ages and to the population over the
working ages is high and increasing adult
male mortality in the European part of the
USSR, especially between age 40 and 60.
Adult male mortality was especially high
in the RSFSR. In 1969-70, a male in the
RSFSR who had survived to age 40 had
only a 75 percent chance of surviving to
age 60. In Soviet Central Asia and Trans-
caucasia, a 40-year-old man in 1969-70
had an 86 percent chance of living to age
60. The level of adult male mortality in the
RSFSR in 1969-70 was higher than in any
other developed country. In 1985-86, the
chance that a 40-year-old male in the
RSFSR would live to his sixtieth birthday
was still only 75 percent; however, the
earlier worsening of adult male mortality
in the RSFSR had stopped.
In contrast, in 1985-86 males in Arme-
nia experienced the lowest mortality of any
republic population in the 40-60 age range.
In that year, a 40-year-old male in Armenia
30. Recall that, as shown in Figure 2a, only 32
percent of births in 1987 occurred in the Muslim
republics. Moreover, only 25 percent of the 15- to
19-year-olds in 1987 resided in the Muslim republics.
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had an 86 percent chance of living to age
60. The reported mortality in Armenia for
adult males between the ages of 40 and 60
was comparable to that in the Federal Re-
public of Germany in 1981-82 or Japan in
1969-70, although it was lower than that of
American men in 1981-82.3’
CONCLUSION
One lesson from this analysis is that the
study of Soviet demographic behavior re-
quires sensitivity to differences in behavior
between regions and ethnic groups. These
differences must be an important aspect of
any attempt to explain the trends in the
behavior and composition of the Soviet
population.
The ethnic differentials in rates of pop-
ulation growth that we have shown make
clear why so many issues in social policy
in the Soviet Union have different implica-
tions for different ethnic groups. Pronatal-
ist policies in the USSR, aimed primarily
at the non-Muslim groups, exist alongside
programs to reduce fertility among Muslim
women. School enrollments are holding
steady or increasing moderately in much of
the USSR but growing rapidly in the
Muslim areas. Increasing shares of con-
scripts to the armed forces and of new
entrants to the labor force come from the
Muslim populations; decreasing shares
come from Russians and other non-
Muslims.
Furthermore, a majority of the net incre-
ment to the labor force comes from the
Muslim republics. This presents certain
problems for the development of the Soviet
economy. The main problem is not the
education and skill levels of population
from these republics. New entrants to the
working ages from the Muslim republics
are probably, on average, better educated
than the workers who are leaving the labor
force through retirement or death. Instead,
the problems relate to the location and mo-
bility of the indigenous populations of the
Muslim SSRs. The populations show little
inclination to move from their traditional
regions of settlement to areas that are ex-
periencing labor shortages, and they usu-
ally have poor command of the Russian
language and hence cannot move to just
any job for which their technical or other
skills qualify them. Moreover, since non-
indigenous populations seem to be depart-
ing from the Muslim republics, there is
even less incentive for the members of the
titular nationality to leave their home re-
public in search of work or career opportu-
nities or to improve their facility in the
Russian language.
The changing ethnic composition of So-
viet regions - toward greater Russianiza-
tion of the European republics and greater
indigenization of the non-European
ones - is also important for understanding
the ethnic politics of the Soviet Union. In
the Baltic republics and Moldavia, leaders
of the Communist Party and of popular-
front movements have sought to limit the
in-migration of Russians in order to pre-
serve the culture and language of the titular
nationality and to assert greater local con-
trol over the future economic and political
development of their republics. If the pol-
icy of economic and political perestroika
(&dquo;restructuring&dquo;) continues to evolve to-
ward greater local autonomy, then these
31. For further discussion, see Anderson and Sil-
ver, "Sex Differentials"; idem, "Changing Shape."
The Central Asian republics report fairly low adult
male mortality. We think that this is partially a result
of underreporting of mortality and overstatement of
age in Central Asia. See Anderson and Silver, "Chang-
ing Shape."
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non-Russian republics are likely to become
less hospitable to in-migrants from nontitu-
lar nationalities than they have been in the
past. In most non-European republics, out-
migration of Russians and other non-
indigenous nationalities was under way
well before Mikhail Gorbachev came to
power in 1985. Further implementation of
perestroika is likely to help sustain that
tendency.
